Tezin Türü: Yüksek Lisans
Tezin Yürütüldüğü Kurum: Marmara Üniversitesi, Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü, Türkiye
Tezin Onay Tarihi: 2022
Tezin Dili: İngilizce
Öğrenci: NEVZAT ÖZCANDAN
Asıl Danışman (Eş Danışmanlı Tezler İçin): Ali Fuat Alkaya
Açık Arşiv Koleksiyonu: AVESİS Açık Erişim Koleksiyonu
Özet:
"Honeywords" provide both enhancements to hashed password security and
detection of password database breaches by intentional insertion of trap
passwords–named as honeywords– along with each user's account.
Nevertheless, there
are several primary security problems associated with the honeyword
mechanism such as targeted password guessing and multiple system
intersection attacks caused by password reuse. In this thesis, we first
present a brief analysis of pitfalls in the existing honeyword schemes
Superword, Append Secret Model, and Erguler's scheme. In particular, we
propose an attack on Erguler's honeyword scheme and show that it can be
fully broken by online login attempts even if an adversary just
compromises the password file once. We propose a novel honeyword scheme,
named Panacea, that mitigates the threat of password file breaches and
offline password inversion attacks. Our scheme works efficiently and for
every user in the system regardless of their password choices before
detecting the threat on a password file. Additionally, we discuss that
recent honeyword schemes have more in common with distributed password
storage schemes and thus suggest an alternative scheme, the
simplification of the Panacea, that does reasonably well in satisfying
security and complexity aspects. The extensive analysis demonstrates
that both our proposed schemes overcome most of the limitations and
vulnerabilities of previously proposed honeyword schemes. We compare our
proposed schemes with the existing ones under
various attacks to validate our claims. This thesis will help to make
systems more secure, which have become the target of many possible
cyberattacks, especially those who are interested in information
security, by stealing the password database by the adversary.