Prohairesis in Aristotle and Epictetus: A Comparative Study


HATİPOĞLU S. E.

Kaygı. Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi, cilt.22, ss.45-64, 2014 (Hakemli Dergi) identifier

Özet

The concept of prohairesis in Aristotelian ethics, usually translated as deliberate choice or policy decision, is later revived by Epictetus, a major figure among the Stoics. In this paper I critically examine how the concept of prohairesis is employed by Aristotle and by Epictetus and the differences involved. Aristotle’s concept of prohairesis acquires its meaning in a framework according to which we live in a world where at least some things are up to us whereas Epictetus’s concept of prohairesis acquires its meaning in a framework where nothing is up to us. As such, Aristotle’s concept of prohairesis is essentially about choice and assumes freedom and thereby more ethical in character, whereas Epictetus’s concept of prohairesis is used to provide a metaphysical basis for freedom and as such less ethical in character.