The ethical nature of law is one of the most important topics in legal philosophy and is actually closely related to the following question: Which dimension of law is the most important: Justice, order or society? Regardless of the fact that according to the adherents of natural law, justice has priority, one can express that order is the existential condition of law, with the rest being the conditions of the continuity of law. In any case, it seems that the law has the task of being accountable to ethics. This fact also points to the separation between the categories be and should. In this context, there is a danger, namely the ethicization of the law, which we should be careful about. Generally speaking, it can be said that this fact, namely the separation between law and ethics, in other words the category of being and should be, was also the opinion of the Islamic scholars. Because of the religious nature of Islamic law, it must also be mentioned that instead of the statement “ethics” it is better to use “ethics-religious”. There is another problem with regard to Islamic law: Where to find the category sollen, in the revealed texts or in the maxims of Islamic law. Because the topic has been discussed in this article using the example of aš-Šāṭıbī, we prefer the second approach, namely the content of the category ought is determined from the side of the maxim of Islamic law. The project developed by Schatıbi and discussed in this article was called “The Review of Law from the Side of Ethics”. While aš-Šāṭıbī presents his project, he has benefited from the systematics and terminology of Usul al-Figh. It is also striking that he quoted most from the work Iḥyāu ʿUlῡmuʾd-dīn by Ġazzālī. In addition, his important contribution lies in the fact that his approach can influence the nature of law. The contribution of Schatıbi was presented in this article in the example of some topics that look typical. These topics are “The responsibility (taklīf) outside aḏ-ḏimma”, “Defining vazʿî legal provisions from the perspective of wisdom (ḥikma)”, “Adding the afterlife perspective to the definition of the terms “Valid (ṣihha)” and “Invalid (butlān)” and “The invalidity of the legal results (musabbab) In order to understand the meaning of the term “The responsibility (taklīf) outside aḏ- ḏimma”, one must take into account that the concept of law is to be presented in the context of the concepts of right-duty and obligation. It is at this point that Shatıbi points out that there are some duties in Islam that do not fall into this category, such as giving a donation to a poor person or helping a drowning person. It is to be determined that such duties were actually categorized by the Islamic jurists under the ethical duties. In addition, such actions are specific and therefore another problem, which was also discussed by aš-Šāṭıbī, arises as to whether indefinite actions can be legally required. Another example of Shatıbis’ project can be found in the definitions of some terms, such as the term ʿilla (Legal basis, ratio legis). For the classical Usul scholars, it is important that ʿilla is described as an objective property. This approach is actually also important for determinism in a legal system. The definition given by Shatıbi is as follows: “The ʿilla is the good (maṣlaḥa) that exists behind the religious commands or the evil (mafsada) that exists behind the religious prohibitions”. As can be seen from this statement, aš-Šāṭıbī ignores objectivity. Likewise, in aš-Šāṭıbī’s thinking, the concepts of valid (ṣaḥīḥ) and invalid (bāṭil) were defined not only from the perspective of this world, but also from the perspective of the hereafter. This is also another sign of the author’s religious-ethical sensitivity. In short, one can say that all these examples indicate that the author intended that the law be examined from the side of the ethical and religious dimension.