in: The ‘New Turkey’ in the Broader Middle East: Reflections on International Relations Theory, TZIARRAS ZENONAS,GÖKSEL OĞUZHAN, Editor, Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp.83-110, 2025
Concepts and theories in social sciences emerge from—and reflect—social reality. Social scientists should not pay attention to every gossip, fabrication, scandal, or mystery. As such, it is incumbent upon social scientists to clarify whether contested concepts such as Neo-Ottomanism have any substance and how they should be considered. This article tries to clarify Neo-Ottomanism in light of ideological, theoretical, and factual evidence. It is argued that due to its controversial and potentially provocative conceptualization and practical implications, at least for some observers in Turkey and the world, Neo-Ottomanism appears rather vague and slippery, depending on the arbitrary views and objectives of its proponents and opponents. Neo-Ottomanism, although initially advocated by the late President Turgut Özal immediately after the Cold War, was actually implemented during the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) governments mainly under the influence of ideas and instructions of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who served as (chief foreign policy advisor, foreign minister, and) prime minister and head of AK Party until he was dismissed from these positions in May 24 and 22, 2016, respectively. However, the implementation of Neo-Ottomanism was not exclusive to the Davutoğlu era, nor was it linear at all as it gradually mutated—resulting in many unexpected consequences for Turkish foreign policy. The core argument of this chapter is that there have been three mainstream variants of Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policy over the years: “Kantian”, “Constructivist” and “Interventionist”. The chapter briefly evaluates the causes, developments, and consequences of these versions for Turkish foreign policy as well as for regional and world politics, which arguably have been partly positive and partly negative.