Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2026 (AHCI, Scopus)
This paper critically discusses Edmund Husserl’s conception of ‘Europe’ and the limitation it poses on the methodology of phenomenology. Husserl’s invention of the idea of Europe from Ancient Greek heritage as an ideal and spirit leads him to privilege a particular kind of rationality in the name of universal-scientific phenomenology. For him, non-European ‘philosophies’ are not philosophy in a genuine sense; rather he speaks of them as ‘practical’ or ‘world-knowledge’. The methodological basis for this claim and its Eurocentric supremacy is rooted in Husserl’s attribution of a fundamental role to epochē and transcendental reduction in phenomenology. I address the implications of Husserl’s problematic concept of Europe as a part of his transcendental phenomenology. First, I present how this idea of Europe is based on asserting superiority over others who remained outside of this spirit. Furthermore, I demonstrate how Husserl’s idea of Europe is linked to transcendentalism in phenomenology. This brings us closer to discussing Husserl’s conceptualization of epochē and reduction, and above all, what counts as ‘genuine philosophy’ for Husserl. My inquiry shows that epochē and reduction imply an unachievable characterization of phenomenology, and questioning them can be instrumental in contemplating a ‘provincialized’ Europe in the phenomenological movement.